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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine that carves out “true threats” from First Amendment 
protection has been unclear, in its scope and operation, since the exception was 
first recognized more than half a century ago. This category of unprotected 
speech was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1961, in a decision that 
identified “true threats” as distinct from other, protected, potentially 
threatening speech, but did not articulate a standard which lower courts could 
apply to distinguish the two.1 In the fifty years since, the Court has addressed 
the constitutional bounds of the true threat doctrine only once, clarifying that 
true threats require some showing of intent.2 But even that more precise 
articulation of the standard3 left unresolved whether the relevant intent 
standard is what the speaker of a threat actually, subjectively intended, or what 
a reasonable listener would have understood the speaker to intend. Rather than 
revisit the doctrine and resolve the intent-requirement question definitively, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined opportunities to clarify, instead 
deciding threat cases on statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds,4 and, 
more recently, declining to hear new threat cases as they arise.5 
Even as the development of the true threat doctrine has stagnated, the 
nature of communication has changed dramatically with the advent of the 
Internet and the increasing prevalence of social media. These new platforms 
only heighten the stakes of inconsistencies in the true threat doctrine and 
highlight the need for a clear standard that tells courts whose intent governs 
whether a statement is a threat.6 While in-person communication has never 
been immune to misunderstandings and erroneous interpretations, speech that 
is mediated by information networks and binary code amplifies the potential 
for a receiving user to interpret a statement as conveying something different 
than what the speaker intended to convey.7 Where the potential for 
 
1 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); see also infra notes 12–16 and accompanying 
text (discussing Watts and the beginnings of the true threat exception in greater detail). 
2 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
3 See id. (“‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate 
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals.”); see also infra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
4 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012-13 (2015) (resolving the appeal on statutory, 
rather than First Amendment, grounds). 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 38–43 (discussing the Court’s denials of petitions for 
certiorari filed by defendants prosecuted under threat statutes after Elonis). 
6 See, e.g., Thomas “Tal” DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only Approach 
to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) in Light of United States v. Jeffries and the Norms of Online Social Networking, 51 
HOUS. L. REV. 981, 1016 (2014) (noting that application of the federal threat statute to online speech 
“expose[d] fractures” in the doctrine). 
7 See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I "#$%&'()*+ U: Considering the Context 
of Online Threats, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1885, 1908 (2018) (“[T]he gun emoji . . . looks like a space 
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misinterpretation is great, the principles underlying the First Amendment 
should require that a speaker’s actual intent to threaten be proved as an 
element of conviction, to sufficiently protect individuals whose speech might 
otherwise be construed as threatening due to interpretive errors, idiosyncratic 
usage, identity-based stereotyping, or other misrepresentation.8 But the same 
online speech that reveals these weaknesses in the true threat doctrine can also 
be relevant in resolving them, by providing a record of how online speech was 
created, interpreted, and modified by a speaker and her audience.9 This 
evidence, where it is available, should be put to use by prosecutors and defense 
attorneys to enable factfinders to more accurately assess a defendant’s intent. 
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the development of the 
true threat doctrine up to the current juncture. Part II briefly explains how a 
carefully applied subjective-intent requirement should operate, in conjunction 
with a requirement that the punishable speech be objectively threatening, to 
protect the First Amendment rights of speakers by maintaining a protective 
zone for individuals to engage in expressive—even hyperbolic—speech 
without fear of prosecution for speech that inadvertently misses the mark. Part 
III canvasses social science literature to suggest ways in which courts can more 
meaningfully—and more consistently—engage with the context surrounding 
utterances posted on social media, which can provide more evidentiarily 
grounded insight into a posting user’s intent if he is prosecuted for an alleged 
threat. Part IV assesses the extent to which courts hearing Internet-mediated 
threat cases are already using contextual evidence to support findings of 
subjective intent, and identifies shortfalls in the reasoning of these decisions 
where more contextual evidence would facilitate more consistent, accurate, 
and speech-protective outcomes. Part V considers one existing proposal for 
procedural reform in light of current practices. 
 
pistol on some platforms and like a revolver on others.”); see also Full Emoji List, v12.0, UNICODE, 
http://www.unicode.org/emoji/charts/full-emoji-list.html [https://perma.cc/G4RH-59KV] (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2019) (showing this and other variations in how the same emoji display across 
different platforms). How emojis display on different platforms can significantly affect how they are 
perceived by readers. See Jonathan Geneus, Note, Emoji: The Caricatured Lawsuit, 16 COLO. TECH. 
L.J. 431, 451 (2018) (“Objectively, an officer pointed his gun at a cartoon. Subjectively, however, a 
white officer pointed a gun at a black male cartoon.”). 
8 See generally, e.g., Adam Dunbar & Charis E. Kubrin, Imagining Violent Criminals: An 
Experimental Investigation of Music Stereotypes and Character Judgments, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 507 (2018) (finding that study participants who read “violent” song lyrics were more 
likely to find them reflective of “bad character” if told that they were lyrics to a rap song, rather 
than a song of another genre, or that the writer was black, rather than of another race). 
9 See, e.g., The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Primer on Social Media, Second 
Edition, 20 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 44-52 & nn.94, 100 (2019) (discussing various methods of accessing 
and preserving both “static images of social media data” and the underlying “metadata, logging data, 
or other information,” and noting that an individual post on Twitter or Facebook contains “over 20 
specific metadata items”). 
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE 
“‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”10 Applying the 
label of “true threat” to an utterance places it outside the protection of the 
First Amendment.11 Cognizant that applying this exception broadly would 
run counter to the First Amendment purpose of limiting government 
interference with expression, the Supreme Court has always recognized the 
need to limit the scope of the true threat exception.12 But the Court has so 
far resisted clarifying the means by which legislatures and courts should 
balance a government’s interest in preventing individuals from living in fear 
after credible threats of violence with the imperative that distasteful or 
unpopular speech that is not imminently harmful is still subject to the 
protections of the First Amendment. 
A. Watts Through Black—Uncertain Protection 
In Watts v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
a statute prohibiting “knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any threat to take 
the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States.”13 
It nonetheless reversed the conviction of the defendant-petitioner, who had 
been overheard in a small group discussion at an antiwar rally on the National 
Mall, saying, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in 
my sights is L.B.J.”14 The Court did not resolve the question raised by the 
divided court of appeals below, as to whether a successful prosecution required 
a showing that the defendant intended to carry out his threat.15 Instead, the 
Court held that the threat at issue could not be a “true ‘threat’” because, in the 
context of political debate in which it occurred, “regarding the expressly 
conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners,” it could 
not have been interpreted as any more than a crude form of political speech.16 
 
10 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 
(1969); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
11 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-18 (2012). 
12 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (“[W]e must interpret the language Congress chose ‘against the 
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open [sic], and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.’” (quoting N. Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). 
13 Id. at 705 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 871(a)). 
14 Id. at 706. 
15 Id. at 707-08. 
16 Id. at 708. 
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Two decades later, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court clarified in dicta 
the reasoning behind the outcome in Watts.17 That opinion explains that the 
harm caused by threats is the fear of violence they instill in individuals, the 
disruption such fear can cause, and the possibility that the threatened violence 
will actually occur.18 The Court relied on this explanation in Virginia v. Black, 
the first case after Watts to squarely address the constitutionality of a statute 
prohibiting threats.19 There, the Court held unconstitutional a statute that 
prohibited burning a cross with the intent to intimidate a person or group, 
where burning a cross could constitute prima facie evidence of that intent to 
intimidate.20 In light of R.A.V.’s explanation of the harm posed by threats, 
intimidation constituted a “type of true threat, where a speaker directs a 
threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim 
in fear,” and that some cross burnings could—and historically, had—fit within 
this definition.21 But the second piece of the statute, which provided that the 
fact of burning a cross would constitute prima facie evidence of the 
defendant’s intent to intimidate, “strip[ped] away the very reason why a State 
may ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate.”22 A jury would not need 
to find that a defendant in fact had a subjective intent to intimidate in order 
to convict her, making it possible that the defendant could be convicted for 
an act of “lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is 
designed to protect.”23 
B. Elonis—Failure to Clarify 
After Black, which struck down a statute that criminalized speech without 
requiring that the speaker have a subjective intent to threaten, the question 
nevertheless remained open whether the First Amendment requires such a 
showing of subjective intent in a prosecution for a true threat.24 The Court’s 
 
17 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
18 See id. at 388 (listing these as the reasons “why threats of violence are outside the First 
Amendment”). The decision ultimately turned on a different question of First Amendment doctrine, 
the “fighting words” exception, and held unconstitutional a statute that prohibited only fighting words 
aimed at members of certain protected classes as an impermissible content-based restriction. Id. at 381. 
19 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
20 Id. at 347-48. 
21 Id. at 360. 
22 Id. at 364-65. 
23 Id. at 365; see also id. at 365-66 (“As the history of cross burning indicates, a burning cross is 
not always intended to intimidate. . . . The prima facie provision makes no effort to 
distinguish . . . between a cross burning done with the purpose of creating anger or resentment and 
a cross burning done with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim.”). 
24 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16-20, Elonis v. United States (No. 13-983), 135 S. Ct. 
2001 (2015) (noting a circuit split and “widespread confusion” as to whether Black meant that the 
First Amendment required a showing of subjective intent in addition to an objective, “reasonable 
speaker” showing). 
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decision twelve years later in Elonis v. United States, its next and most recent on 
the subject of true threats, declined to answer the constitutional question, instead 
relying again on principles of statutory interpretation to read a subjective-intent 
requirement into the general federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).25 
Elonis was convicted under § 875(c) for posting “graphically violent” rap 
lyrics on a Facebook page, first under his real name and then using a pen 
name.26 While some of the lyrics Elonis posted referred to clearly fictitious 
people and situations, others referenced his coworkers and “included crude, 
degrading, and violent material about his soon-to-be ex-wife,” and caused the 
people referenced to fear for their safety.27 The district court rejected Elonis’s 
request for a jury instruction that a conviction required proof of Elonis’s 
“inten[t] to communicate a true threat,” a question raised by Elonis’s testimony 
that his lyrics were fictitious—like those of the rapper Eminem, who has never 
been prosecuted for recording songs with lyrics that included specific 
“fantasies of killing his ex-wife.”28 The jury was instead instructed to convict 
Elonis if a reasonable person would foresee that the lyrics would be interpreted 
as a threat, and on that basis they found him guilty of violating § 875(c).29 
In vacating Elonis’s conviction and remanding the case for further 
proceedings under a subjective-intent standard, the Supreme Court rejected 
the notion that convictions under this particular statute could be supported by 
only a showing that the defendant “himself knew the contents and context of 
[the Facebook posts that formed the basis for his prosecution], and a 
reasonable person would have recognized that the posts would be read as 
genuine threats.”30 Such a conviction would impermissibly rely on a negligence 
standard, which is out of place in the context of criminal prosecution.31 
In separate dissents, Justices Alito and Thomas criticized the majority for 
leaving open the question whether a showing of recklessness could also 
 
25 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012, 2013 (2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2018) (prohibiting 
“transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to 
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another”). 
26 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004-05. 
27 Id. at 2005-06. 
28 Id. at 2007-08. One of Elonis’s posts referencing his ex-wife—and the restraining order she 
had obtained against him—included the following lyrics: “Fold up your [protection-from-abuse 
order] and put it in your pocket / Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? / . . . And if worse comes to 
worse / I’ve got enough explosives / to take care of the State Police and the Sheriff ’s Department.” 
Id. at 2006. In a song titled “Kim,” the name of his ex-wife, Eminem raps: “Ha-ha, gotcha! Go ahead, 
yell! / Here, I’ll scream with you, ‘Ah! Somebody help!’ / Don’t you get it, bitch? No one can hear 
you! / Now shut the fuck up, and get what’s comin’ to you! / You were supposed to love me! / Now 
bleed, bitch, bleed!” Eminem — Kim Lyrics, GENIUS LYRICS, https://genius.com/Eminem-kim-lyrics 
[https://perma.cc/J4SH-8XMK]. 
29 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007. 
30 Id. at 2011. 
31 Id. 
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support a conviction under § 875(c).32 Justice Thomas objected to the 
majority opinion’s effect of displacing the precedent of nine circuits, which 
he characterized as requiring proof of “general intent” for conviction under 
§ 875(c), and providing no specific guidance as to what standard replaced it.33 
Justice Thomas further contended that neither Watts nor Black had come to 
any conclusion on a constitutional requirement to consider the subjective 
intent behind a threat—and that in any event, an objective test, which asked 
how a reasonable speaker in the defendant’s position would have expected his 
utterance to be received, would confer sufficient protection because it would 
“forc[e] jurors to examine the circumstances in which a statement is made.”34 
Justice Alito argued that the Court should have clarified that a mens rea of 
recklessness was sufficient, both to support a criminal conviction and to 
interpret § 875(c) in a manner that did not violate the First Amendment.35 
Because the harm with which threat statutes are concerned does not change 
based on the speaker’s mental state, in Justice Alito’s reading, the applicability 
of the true-threat exception to First Amendment protection could not turn 
on this distinction.36 Instead of requiring a mens rea of knowledge or purpose, 
Justice Alito proposed that evaluating speech in the proper context would be 
sufficient to protect speakers who engage in artistic expression not meant to 
put anyone in fear of harm.37 
C. After Elonis—Opportunities to Elaborate 
The Court has not yet faced the two questions left open by its decision in 
Elonis: whether showing recklessness as to a statement’s possible interpretation 
is a sufficiently high bar to support a conviction under § 875(c), and whether 
the Constitution requires a showing of subjective intent at all for threat 
convictions. Justice Sotomayor’s “reluctant[] concur[rence]” in the 2017 denial 
of certiorari in Perez v. Florida recognized that some clarification is needed on 
 
32 See id. at 2013 (“Both Justice Alito and Justice Thomas complain about our not deciding 
whether recklessness suffices for liability under Section 875(c).” (capitalization altered)). 
33 Id. at 2018 (explaining that the previous standard had “require[d] no more than that a 
defendant knew he transmitted a communication, knew the words used in that communication, and 
understood the ordinary meaning of those words in the relevant context”); see also id. at 2022 (“The 
majority . . . casts my application of general intent as a negligence standard disfavored in the 
criminal law.”). 
34 Id. at 2027 (quoting United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2012)). 
35 Id. at 2014-16. 
36 Id. at 2015-16. 
37 Id. at 2016-17; see also id. at 2016 (“[C]ontext matters. ‘Taken in context,’ lyrics in songs that 
are performed for an audience or sold in recorded form are unlikely to be interpreted as a real threat 
to a real person. Statements on social media that are pointedly directed at their victims, by contrast, 
are much more likely to be taken seriously.” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 
(1969)) (citation omitted)). 
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both questions.38 In April 2019, the Court denied a petition for certiorari in 
Knox v. Pennsylvania.39 That petition had preserved and squarely presented the 
question “whether, to establish that a statement is a true threat unprotected by 
the First Amendment, the government must show that a ‘reasonable person’ 
would regard the statement as a sincere threat of violence, or whether it is 
enough to show only the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten.”40 The 
petition sought review of a conviction under Pennsylvania’s terroristic threat 
statute, interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to require a showing 
of only subjective intent.41 In arguing that clarification of the First Amendment 
standard for true threats is urgently needed, the petition outlined the disparate 
standards currently applied across the federal circuits and state courts.42 The 
majority of states and some federal courts of appeals apply an objective-only 
standard while a minority of states and other circuits apply a subjective-only 
standard, with the result that in some cases, the standard to be applied depends 
on “which prosecutor decides to bring charges.”43 
Three Justices have now articulated an interest in clarifying the 
implications of the Elonis decision: Justices Thomas and Alito in dissents to 
that decision and Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in the denial of 
certiorari in Perez. But the Court still summarily denied the petition for 
certiorari in Knox. In doing so, the Court again declined to actually clarify the 
constitutional requirement that applies to statutes criminalizing threats. As 
the Court remains silent on the questions raised by true threat prosecutions, 
further questions accumulate behind that one: Not only are lower courts left 
without an authoritative constitutional standard, but they are left to apply 
these divergent standards to an increasingly broad range of social media 
contexts which raise new and complicated questions about how speech should 
be regulated. As a first step toward recalibrating the scope of the true threat 
exception, the Court should take the earliest opportunity to recognize a 
uniform constitutional standard that requires proving both a subjective intent 
to cause fear of harm and the objective, reasonable foreseeability of such 
harm, in order to support a conviction for making a threat. 
 
38 137 S. Ct. 853, 854-55 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“In an 
appropriate case, the Court should affirm that [a jury cannot convict solely on the basis of the words 
a defendant used]. The Court should also decide precisely what level of intent suffices under the 
First Amendment.”). 
39 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (summary order). 
40 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Knox, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 277506 
[hereinafter Cert Petition, Knox]. 
41 Id. at 6-7. 
42 Id. at 9-14. 
43 Id. 
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II. SUBJECTIVE INTENT AS A NECESSARY COMPONENT 
OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
Clarification of the intent standard will require addressing two distinct 
sources of indeterminacy. First, imposition of any intent requirement 
prompts a question of what proof will suffice. At its core, intent is an internal 
phenomenon which produces no physical evidence and is knowable only by 
the person who experiences it44—if at all.45 And it will rarely be in a 
defendant’s interest to testify that she possessed the intent required to convict 
her of a charged offense.46 As a result, proof of intent much more frequently 
turns on circumstantial, objective evidence meant to persuade a jury that the 
defendant’s intent to bring about an outcome is the most reasonable 
explanation for the way she acted under the circumstances.47 Disputes over 
whether the circumstantial evidence offered is sufficient to show the requisite 
intent can arise in any area of law where intent is relevant; these disputes will 
frequently involve narrow line-drawing based on the facts at hand.48 
And such determinations are complicated further in prosecutions for 
crimes effected through speech. Where a prosecutor establishing intent on a 
murder charge, for instance, may point to laws of the physical universe in 
 
44 E.g., Long v. State, 867 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 cmt. c, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2005); 
David Crump, What Does Intent Mean?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1059, 1071-72 & nn.82-84 (2010) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Pond, 846 A.2d 699, 707 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)). 
45 For a brief overview of the “self-serving” cognitive bias and other ways in which individuals’ 
ability to accurately assess their own motivations are clouded, see Thomas Shelley Duval & Paul J. 
Silvia, Self-Awareness, Probability of Improvement, and the Self-Serving Bias, 82 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49-50 (2002). 
46 Cf. Crump, supra note 44, at 1072 (“[I]ntent is easily denied or rebutted, even when it exists, 
and sometimes the denial is accompanied by convincing belief on the part of the actor.”). 
47 See id. at 1072 (“[T]he law evaluates intent by what the actor does, which means that the law 
evaluates intent by circumstantial evidence.”). The chasm between what subjective intent is and how 
it is proved in a court of law highlights the need for a precise definition of the standard by which 
intent is found to exist, as this standard will also determine what kind of rebuttal arguments are 
judged sufficient to overcome the circumstantial evidence presented. See id. at 1072, 1074-78 
(describing how different forms of rebuttal of intent operate to undercut the persuasive value of 
circumstantial evidence). 
48 See, e.g., United States v. Souder, 436 F. App’x 280, 292 (4th Cir. 2011) (declining to overturn 
the grant of a motion for a new trial on fraud charges where that decision was based on “the district 
court[’s] cho[ice] to credit the Defendants’ innocent explanations for their actions over the sinister 
interpretation posited by the government”); People v. Johnson, 27 N.Y.2d 119, 123 (1970) (concluding, 
where a defendant’s testimony at trial denying an intent to commit burglary when he entered the 
premises contradicted his statement to police and extrinsic evidence from the time of his arrest, that 
the resolution of the issue was “open to the People to test credibility by the inconsistencies in his 
statement”); see also generally Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider 
and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002) (weighing 
arguments for and against applying the same intent standard to prosecutions for aiding and abetting 
criminal activity as for principal offenses). 
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establishing that a defendant must have known a certain outcome was 
probable—and therefore was more likely to have been done intentionally than 
unintentionally49—no such universal background rules exist for the causes and 
effects of language use.50 Instead, the bounds of conversation are governed by 
the context in which they occur, including the participants’ relationships to 
one another, their subjective understandings of the situation, and any previous 
interactions that have occurred between them.51 At the same time, though, 
participants rarely make explicit within a conversation the rules by which the 
conversation will operate.52 Where the ‘rules’ of a conversation are never fixed 
or stated out loud but are nonetheless crucial to understanding what has been 
said, a careful examination of context is crucial if one party is at risk of criminal 
conviction for the content she contributed to the conversation.53 
It is not a novel observation that speech and language are central to many 
human functions,54 but it is one that has yet to be fully felt in the operation 
 
49 But see Crump, supra note 44, at 1066-67 (characterizing the presumption that “a man is 
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts[]” as imposing a “preponderance” 
or “awareness of likelihood” standard on criminal liability (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
50 Trial lawyers use analogies to physical actions to explain intent to juries. See id. at 1073 & 
n.95 (describing the author’s experience of explaining evidence of intent to a jury through the 
example of a person who got up and walked out of the courtroom as intending to leave). But because 
speech is so contextually determined, it is difficult to imagine a comparably simple analogy that 
would suffice to explain when a threat could be presumably intended. 
51 See, e.g., H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 PETER COLE & JERRY L. MORGAN, 
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41, 45-46 (1975) (proposing “maxims” of conversation 
that interlocutors must presume of one another, to explain how communication is effective in the 
absence of identifiable rules); Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1909-10 (describing how “discourse 
conventions” that govern online speech may vary across platforms and between social groups on the 
same platform, causing online speech to be misconstrued). 
52 See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 172 (1966) (“Most 
conversation . . . takes place against the background of a world that is silently taken for granted. 
Thus, an exchange such as, ‘Well, it’s time for me to get to the station’, and ‘Fine, darling, have a 
good day at the office’, implies an entire world within which these apparently simple propositions 
make sense.”); Erving Goffman, Replies and Responses, 5 LANGUAGE IN SOC’Y 257, 259-60, 268 (1976) 
(describing the embedded meanings and assumptions that allow “Milk and sugar?” to be a complete, 
intelligible response to the question “Have you got coffee to go?”). 
53 Cf. Caleb Mason, Framing Context, Anonymous Internet Speech, and Intent: New Uncertainty 
About the Constitutional Test for True Threats, 41 SW. L. REV. 43, 101-10 (2011) (recognizing that an 
objective-intent-only standard, without a requirement to show specific speaker intent, would render 
threats a “perlocutionary” crime). 
54 See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 176-77 (noting the “simple 
but often overlooked fact” that “nearly all human action . . . operates through communication” and 
the associated tendency of modern regulation to operate through speech rather than conduct); 
Bonnie Urciuoli & Chaise LaDousa, Language Management/Labor, 2013 ANN. REV. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 175, 176 (describing the rise of language skills in the contemporary United States 
economy as both necessary skills and as a commodity in themselves). 
2020] Context, Content, Intent 743 
of First Amendment protections55—especially as increasingly more speech 
occurs in the public or semipublic forums of the Internet.56 The increase in 
the volume of public expression and the changing media through which it 
occurs give rise to warring impulses as to how that speech should be evaluated 
for First Amendment purposes. On one hand, the ease with which an 
individual can dash off a tweet, Facebook post, or email to her federal 
representative supports a view that online speech taken as a whole is less 
formal, or even less important, than the written forms that preceded it, which 
required more physical effort to produce and cost more to disseminate.57 
Crucially, even the register of the speech that prevails on these platforms can 
contribute to the notion that online speech is less serious, meaningful, or 
valuable than speech disseminated through other media.58 
On the other hand, this apparently casual and largely frivolous speech 
tends to remain publicly available, “recorded and searchable,” making it far 
more accessible to audiences intended and unintended alike, indefinitely.59 
And when an instance of online expression like an insult or a threat is 
discovered by an individual targeted by it (or a concerned third party), there 
can be little hope of convincing that person that the speech raises less cause 
 
55 See Shanor, supra note 54, at 176 (observing that because speech and expressive conduct 
permeate so many areas of human action, a strong version of “the First Amendment possesses near 
total deregulatory potential”). 
56 See, e.g., Edison Research, Infinite Dial 2019 (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.slideshare.net/webby2001/infinite-dial-2019 [https://perma.cc/56H5-3GP8] (navigate 
to slide 5 of 62) (estimating that in early 2019 there were 223 million social media users in the United 
States); see also Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech, 71 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 355, 359 (2012) (“With the growth of digital communications, there is more 
content being published than before . . . . This content includes not only professionally produced 
content, but all the amateur content, conversations and comments that are made by users.”). 
57 See, e.g., SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, No. 07-6311, 2008 WL 11348459, at *5 (D. 
Idaho Dec. 23, 2008) (advancing the “general understanding that Internet blogs, message boards, 
and chat rooms are, by their nature, typically casual expressions of opinion”); John Cluverius, How 
the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Affect Legislator Responsiveness, 70 POL. RES. Q. 279, 280-81, 
286-88 (2017) (describing legislators’ efforts to adapt to the higher volume of constituent contacts 
made possible by email and other mass communication tools by searching for new heuristics to 
indicate that a particular issue is of high importance). 
58 See, e.g., Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does, No. 03-33, 2003 WL 22149380, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (relying on the general appearance and style of messages on a message board, including 
“grammar and spelling errors” and an absence of standard capitalization, to decide that no reasonable 
observer would have taken a purportedly defamatory statement as fact). 
59 Rowbottom, supra note 56, at 355-56. Even an individual who realizes after the fact that a social 
media post was in poor taste may not be able to completely erase the record of the expression from the 
Internet. See id. at 356 (describing the prosecution of a man who removed a “joke” page within hours 
of creating it); see also SNAP INC. LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE 4, 9-10 (last updated Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/snap-inc/privacy/lawenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/54WF-SX8K] 
[hereinafter SNAP LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE] (describing the methods by which Snapchat 
messages, which are designed to disappear after twenty-four hours, can in certain circumstances be 
recovered for longer periods of time). 
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for concern because it occurred online or did not employ standard grammar.60 
This inconsistent view of online speech—as generally less valuable or 
meaningful than other forms of speech, but with the potential to do acute, 
potentially legally actionable harm to individuals or discrete groups of 
hearers—creates a trap for the unwary social media user. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “First Amendment 
freedoms need breathing space to survive,” and that this requirement puts the 
onus on governments to draft laws criminalizing speech with “narrow 
specificity.”61 Clearly that specificity should be required of mens rea as well 
as actus reus requirements62: a statute that clearly delineates the type of 
statement to be punished but that does not make clear whether a merely 
reckless, rather than knowing or purposeful utterance, will be punished is 
likely to have a chilling effect on the overall amount of speech produced, 
compared to a statute that clarifies that reckless statements are not covered. 
And if the speech chilled by that vague statute would be legal and subject to 
constitutional protection, then a criminal statute that is vague as to intent has 
the effect of restricting speech in violation of the First Amendment. 
Some convictions under threat statutes that do not require a showing of 
subjective intent to threaten would also have been upheld if a subjective-intent 
showing were required.63 But in the jurisdictions that have continued to 
require only an objective, reasonable-observer standard for threat statutes not 
altered by Elonis,64 some defendants have been convicted for threats made 
without a subjective intent to threaten. These defendants have been 
sanctioned for speech that, under a subjective definition of “true threat,” would 
arguably be within the heart of the First Amendment’s protective sphere.65 
 
60 For examples of ungrammatical, “casual” online speech that nevertheless prompted the 
targeted entities to commence litigation, see generally SI03, Inc., 2008 WL 11348459, and Rocker Mgmt. 
LLC, 2003 WL 22149380. See also Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005-07 (2015) (describing 
grammatically incorrect online speech that caused the speaker’s ex-wife to fear for her safety). 
61 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)). 
62 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 112 (2019) (“Mens rea is generally an essential element 
of any criminal offense.”). 
63 For example, it would be difficult to dispute that a defendant who sent seven specific threats 
of violence to an individual, her family, and an embassy over the course of two months, “accompanied 
by threatening behavior,” did not also evince the subjective intent of putting the targeted individual 
and her family in fear of violence. See United States v. Jordan, 639 F. App’x 768, 770-71 (2d Cir. 2016). 
64 See Cert Petition, Knox, supra note 40, at 11-13 & nn. 4-5 (collecting cases from jurisdictions 
that apply an objective standard alone). 
65 See, e.g., United States v. Dierks, No. 17-2065, 2017 WL 4873067, at *1, *3-4 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 
27, 2017) (allowing a prosecution for true threat to proceed under the Eighth Circuit’s objective-
hearer standard for speech directed at an elected official, over objections that the threats were 
conditional, physically impossible to carry out, and actually intended to be “impolite criticism” like 
the protected speech at issue in Watts); Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1886-87 (describing the 
attempted prosecution of a young man in Texas for what appeared, in context, to be a “hyperbolic 
response to provocation,” a “rant,” or even a poorly calibrated joke); see also Brief of Amici Curiae 
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The fact that speech made carelessly and not clearly outside the protection of 
the First Amendment can carry a sentence of, for example, six years in prison66 
suggests that the objective standard does not offer sufficient protection. 
Particularly where the kind of speech likely to be prosecuted under threat 
statutes may be made off-the-cuff and in the heat of an argument, and where 
the effects of a speech act are not as neatly foreseeable as the consequences of 
physical actions, the absence of formal protection for inadvertently 
threatening speech has the potential to chill a significant amount of speech. 
At least some of that silenced speech would be politically productive or 
facilitative of an individual’s development of personal conscience.67 Allowing 
convictions for true threats to stand without a showing of subjective intent 
leaves unpopular or borderline speech that could plausibly be viewed as having 
a threatening effect underprotected, relative to speech that verges on the outer 
bounds of the First Amendment’s protection for other reasons.68 
An objective component, while not sufficient on its own to protect the First 
Amendment interests at the edge of the true threat doctrine, is still necessary 
in any true threat standard. The Pennsylvania law in the Knox case, which 
allowed a conviction on a showing that the speaker acted with intent to terrorize 
or intimidate, but without a demonstration that any observer actually 
experienced fear or terror as a result, runs counter to the primary justification 
for punishing true threats: that they do, in fact, cause identifiable harm to some 
 
Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. in Support of Petitioner at 16-17, Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 
S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 1115837 [hereinafter Brief of Michael Render (“Killer 
Mike”) et al.] (recognizing prior uses of the phrase “fuck the police” in rap songs as a way to express 
criticism of police). 
66 Associated Press, Iowa Man Gets 6 Years for Threatening U.S. Sen. Joni Ernst, DES MOINES 
REG. (June 14, 2018, 6:26 AM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-
courts/2018/06/13/joseph-hilton-dierks-iowa-joni-ernst-cedar-rapids-capitol-police-federal-harassm
ent-twitter/700225002 [https://perma.cc/QY8V-WLPS]. 
67 Cf. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail . . . .”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (“The harm is the interference with the 
individual’s scruples or conscience—an important area of privacy which the First Amendment fences 
off from government.”). 
68 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982) (holding that 
although “references to the possibility that necks would be broken . . . conveyed a stern[] message,” 
“[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals”); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (“[E]rroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable 
in free debate, and . . . must be protected . . . .”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (“[I]f 
the bookseller is criminally liable [under the obscenity statute] without knowledge of the [book’s] 
contents, . . . he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State 
will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene 
literature.”); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment 
Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 841-42 (characterizing Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler, 
398 U.S. 6 (1970), as endorsing the idea that “speakers should not be held liable for ‘misreadings’ of 
their speech by idiosyncratic or unsophisticated audience members” (emphasis added)). 
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who hear them.69 Additionally, the vast majority of evidence of even subjective 
intent will be objective, circumstantial evidence which already lends itself to an 
objective analysis of the content of the speech.70 This finding is not only 
constitutionally required,71 but also should impose only a minimal additional 
burden in a prosecution for any speech act that could be reasonably regarded as 
a threat—especially as compared to the magnitude of the defendant’s interest 
in avoiding conviction for constitutionally protected activity. 
The objective-intent standard ensures that speech must actually create some 
risk of harm before it is punishable. The subjective-intent standard protects 
speakers who use language idiosyncratically—or in a way unfamiliar to others in 
a community—by requiring that a speaker know that his message may be seen 
as a threat.72 In the contemporary linguistic environment of the United States, 
where many linguistic communities occupy the same physical and discursive 
spaces and there is no basis for a claim that one use of a phrase is objectively 
correct,73 the First Amendment should be understood to require both standards 
be met before a person can be criminally punished on the basis of her speech. 
III. HOW CONTEXT CAN CLARIFY INTENT IN ONLINE SPEECH 
The requirement of subjective and objective mens rea standards will not 
resolve the other question left open by Elonis: what evidence will suffice to prove 
 
69 Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1158-61 (Pa. 2018) (interpreting Black to reject an 
objective standard and relying instead on deducing the defendant’s subjective intent from the 
content and context of his speech); Cert Petition, Knox, supra note 40, at 18 (“[V]irtually every 
exception to the First Amendment’s protections includes a baseline requirement that the speech in 
question be objectively harmful.”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (listing 
“protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from 
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur,” as the harms against which statutes banning 
true threats protect). 
70 See supra text accompanying notes 44–47; but see infra note 143 (proposing that evidence of 
an audience’s reaction can be probative of either subjective intent or a reasonable observer’s reaction, 
depending on when the defendant became aware of the reaction). 
71 See Cert Petition, Knox, supra note 40, at 18 (“[T]he objective standard is the constitutionally 
mandated minimum protection for all speech onto which th[e] Court has layered additional protections.”). 
72 Cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 313 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The law of New 
York does not segregate, according to their diverse nationalities, races, religions, or political 
associations, the vast hordes of people living in its narrow confines. Every individual in this 
frightening aggregation is legally free to live, to labor, to travel, when and where he chooses.”); see 
also id. at 301 (“A hostile reception of his subject certainly does not alone destroy one’s right to 
speak. . . . [I]n a free society all sects and factions, as the price of their own freedom to preach their 
views, must suffer that freedom in others.”). 
73 See Richard A. Epstein, Linguistic Relativism and the Decline of the Rule of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 583, 589 (2016) (describing twentieth-century language philosophers’ rejection of 
“the notion that language has consistent and coherent usage”); Arturo Madrid, Official English: A 
False Policy Issue, 508 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 62, 63 (1990) (“Contrary to popular 
belief, American society never enjoyed a golden age in which we all spoke English; we never were 
all one linguistically.”). 
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a subjective intent to put some audience member in fear of serious harm. Since 
2016, convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) have required a showing of some 
specific intent as to the threat alleged.74 But the Supreme Court has yet to hear an 
appeal of a conviction under this new standard; it has thus provided no guidance 
as to what evidence supports a conviction under a subjective-intent standard—
beyond the bedrock principle that in evaluating threats, “context matters.”75 The 
context of how a defendant communicated a threatening message has the potential 
to illuminate, among other things, why the defendant made the utterance at issue, 
why he chose the words (or pictures or characters) he chose, whom he intended to 
reach with his message, and how he expected the message to be understood by his 
intended audience. With the advent of social media, speakers have an enormous, 
novel opportunity to craft messages such that the choice of platform, audience, 
and form may actually reflect a speaker’s conscious thought about how a message 
would be delivered76—but at the same time, of course, platforms like Facebook, 
Twitter, and message boards are also used impulsively by speakers posting without 
such conscious objectives.77 Where evidence that can provide insight into speakers’ 
intents exists, and where some showing of intent to threaten is a constitutionally 
required element of a threat prosecution, not using available contextual evidence 
to better understand speakers’ intents constitutes an inexplicable oversight by the 
criminal justice system. This Part draws from existing research in the fields of 
sociology and linguistics to propose ways in which context—especially online—
can provide evidence of what a speaker intended to communicate in making a 
public statement. 
 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 25–31 (describing the holding in Elonis). 
75 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1888 (“[E]stablishing the full context 
of [the defendant’s online comments made on Facebook] should be an essential part of determining 
whether he made terroristic threats or merely talked trash with a fellow video gamer.”). 
76 See, e.g., The Secret Formula to Creating a Viral Instagram Post, SOCIALINSIGHT.IO, 
https://socialinsight.io/the-secret-formula-to-creating-a-viral-instagram-post/ [https://perma.cc/PG94-
RGGQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019) (advising that “go[ing] viral” requires “know[ing] what photos to 
post, when to upload them, and how to connect with other users on the network to gain more followers 
and likes”); see also Kevin Roose & Keith Collins, Who’s Winning the Social Media Midterms, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/18/us/politics/social-election.html 
[https://perma.cc/S38D-CSDL] (describing the success of various political campaigns at increasing their 
candidates’ social media engagement). 
77 See, e.g., Stephanie McNeal, People Are Freaking out over This Girl’s Sad Picture of Her Grandpa, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 20, 2016, 6:23 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com
/article/stephaniemcneal/paw-paw-why [https://perma.cc/QA7N-WC7M] (interviewing a woman 
who posted a captioned photo of her grandfather “not expecting it to even get a retweet,” and 
describing the viral reception the photo received); see also mstem, Thinking About the People Behind the 
Viral Videos, MIT CTR. FOR CIVIC MEDIA (May 7, 2012), https://civic.mit.edu/2012/05/07/thinking-
about-the-people-behind-the-viral-videos/ [https://perma.cc/86UF-DSZ6] (collecting stories of 
people whose Internet speech attracted unexpected, outsized attention and contemplating the 
consequences of “go[ing] viral”). 
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A. Accounting for Speaker Identity 
It is widely acknowledged that gender-based, class-based, ethnic, 
geographic, social, and other groups to which a person belongs can affect and 
be affected by how she uses language.78 There is also reason to believe that 
individuals maintain internally consistent writing styles throughout their 
lifetimes, remaining somewhat constant across subject matters as well.79 The 
implications of these findings on threat prosecutions are admittedly weak but 
nevertheless worth noting. Preliminary research suggests that variations in a 
person’s writing style can reveal changes in personality or mental health;80 
while this research is not remotely advanced enough to read the objective 
evidence of a threatening communication to reveal subjective intent to 
threaten, it nonetheless bolsters the argument that a careful, close reading of 
a written statement can provide useful information about a speaker’s intent. 
Additionally, although it is unlikely that a person could go long in the world 
without being alerted that her idiosyncratic personal writing style made her 
innocent statements appear threatening, such a person (if she exists) should 
have the opportunity to show a lack of notice to disprove that she knew or 
intended that her statement would be interpreted as a threat. 
B. Accounting for Audience 
Although individual writing styles are relatively internally consistent, 
people do modulate the way they present themselves in online interactions, 
just as they might in person,81 based on whom they understand to be their 
 
78 See, e.g., Umashanthi Pavalanathan & Jacob Eisenstein, Audience-Modulated Variation in 
Online Social Media, 90 AM. SPEECH 187, 187 (2015) (“Linguistic differences are robust enough to 
support unnervingly accurate predictions of [identity] characteristics based on writing style—with 
algorithmic predictions in some cases outperforming those of human judgments.” (citation 
omitted)); Gretchen McCulloch, Move Over Shakespeare, Teen Girls Are the Real Language Disruptors, 
QUARTZ (Aug. 7, 2015), https://qz.com/474671/move-over-shakespeare-teen-girls-are-the-real-
language-disruptors [https://perma.cc/BM6N-LYTM] (“William Labov[] observed that women 
lead 90% of linguistic change—in a paper he wrote 25 years ago. Researchers continue to confirm 
his findings. It takes about a generation for the language patterns started among young women to 
jump over to men.”); see also generally Matthew L. Newman et al., Gender Differences in Language Use: 
An Analysis of 14,000 Text Samples, 45 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 211 (2008). 
79 See James W. Pennebaker & Laura A. King, Linguistic Styles: Language Use as an Individual 
Difference, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1296, 1308 (1999) (using Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (“LIWC”) analysis to examine writing done by individuals over the course of years and concluding 
that “the ways people express themselves in words are remarkably reliable across time and situations”). 
80 See id. (finding that where study participants wrote about their own emotions, the variation 
in their writing styles “predict[ed] such things as illness as well or better than the [traditional] five-
factor [personality] dimensions”); see also, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) 
(evaluating the purported threat in light of its “expressly conditional nature”). 
81 See, e.g., Benjamin Bailey, Switching, 9 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 241, 242 (1999) 
(describing the phenomenon of intentional “code-switching” as a linguistic adjustment to the 
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audiences.82 Such adjustments may result from a desire to emphasize certain 
aspects of one’s personality, or “self ”;83 to establish rapport with an audience, 
whether that audience is a known individual or a group of known individuals84 
or a larger audience of online “friends” or “followers”;85 or to demonstrate a 
sense of belonging within a certain discourse community.86 These variations 
can affect the way in which a message is conveyed: a student who posts a 
message on her Facebook page, which she uses to interact with friends her 
own age, that she is “dying,” even “literally” so,87 may be best understood as 
engaging in hyperbole to convey some strong emotional state, rather than 
conveying that she is actually dying or contemplating death.88 But that same 
message by the same speaker might be understood differently in a different 
context: Posted on a message board for people undergoing cancer treatment 
or spoken over the phone to an emergency dispatcher, for example, “I’m 
dying” might be better understood as conveying its more literal meaning. 
 
identities of participants in a conversation or in recognition of a setting); Bonnie Urciuoli, Book 
Review, 33 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 153, 153, 156 (2004) (reviewing BENJAMIN H. BAILEY, LANGUAGE, 
RACE, AND NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY (2002)) (describing how Dominican-American students’ 
distinct uses of language with different interlocutors contributed to their own identity formation 
and how others perceived them). 
82 See, e.g., Pavalanathan & Eisenstein, supra note 78, at 189 (“[I]ndividuals modulate their linguistic 
performance as they use social media affordances to control the intended audience of their messages.”). 
83 See Liam Bullingham & Ana C. Vasconcelos, ‘The Presentation of Self in the Online World’: 
Goffman and the Study of Online Identities, 39 J. INFO. SCI. 101, 107-08 (2013) (describing how one 
woman’s two blogs varied in style, according to their purposes of highlighting the professional and 
personal “side[s]” of her personality respectively). 
84 See Cristian Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al., Mark My Words! Linguistic Style Accommodation 
in Social Media, 20 INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. PROC. 745, 746, 750 (2011) (concluding that in 
one-on-one conversations on Twitter, users’ linguistic styles tended to converge and become more 
similar to one another’s); see also generally David Jacobson, Interpreting Instant Messaging: Context and 
Meaning in Computer-Mediated Communication, 63 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 359 (2007) (describing 
the way that shared context can alter how an individual expresses himself to an interlocutor). 
85 See Pavalanathan & Eisenstein, supra note 78, at 201-05 (finding that Twitter users were less 
likely to use geographically specific slang when directing tweets to a wider audience than when 
sending messages to a particular user, especially a user from the same geographic area). 
86 See Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1909-10 (discussing the ways in which speech 
conventions vary by age, gender, and profession on the same social media platform). 
87 Id. at 1912. 
88 See id. at 1912-13 (acknowledging the “generational convention” of teenage hyperbole regarding death 
and speculating that it has been caused in part by the performative, audience-driven nature of social media); 
Jacobson, supra note 84, at 365 (observing different responses to a subject’s use of the phrase “‘please kill me’ 
as an exaggeration in a time of stress,” which varied in part based on how well each interlocutor knew the 
speaker). Speech about bodily harm or death may be uniquely susceptible to misinterpretation. Understood 
literally, such speech reasonably provokes a sense of alarm in hearers; at the same time, some observers suggest 
that younger Americans have developed a particularly macabre sense of humor and are more likely to joke 
about death than older generations, creating situations rife with potential for misunderstanding. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Bruenig, Why Is Millennial Humor So Weird?, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/why-is-millennial-humor-so-weird/2017/08/11/64af9cae-7dd5-11e7-
83c7-5bd5460f0d7e_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9e0f54d8b516 [perma.cc/FHJ9-SZXJ]. 
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Audience-based misinterpretation can occur on platforms where a dyadic, 
or one-on-one, conversation takes place in the view of other observers: for 
example, if Facebook user A comments publicly on the public post of another 
user, B (as opposed to using the direct, private messaging function), and B 
responds with a sub-comment to A’s comment. While this exchange takes place 
between A and B, and may be clearly understood by them to operate under the 
discursive norms they have already established between the two of them, the 
fact remains that the conversation is observable by other Facebook users who 
may not know, for instance, that A means “I’m stressed” when he says “Please 
kill me.”89 A similar problem of interpretation resulted in a prosecution for 
making a terroristic threat when an observer of a Facebook conversation 
between two teenagers interpreted one teen’s statements as a threat, rather than 
hyperbolic trash talk related to a video game the two played together.90 
Jordan Strauss proposes two more criteria, indicative of whether a 
communication shows a subjective intent to invoke fear of violence, which 
consider a speaker’s relationship to his audience: whether the communication 
identifies a specific target and, if so, whether it was reasonably foreseeable that 
the communication would reach the target.91 Implicit in the overlap between 
these criteria are several gradations of likelihood that the communication 
demonstrates subjective intent. A speaker may name a target in a 
communication directed, privately or publicly, at that target, or may 
communicate the purported threat publicly, not to the target but in a manner 
that the target might come across it; finally, he might make a threat at a 
particular, individual target but in a manner that makes it unlikely for the 
target to ever encounter the threat (for example, a private, direct Facebook 
message to a third party).92 Each of these general scenarios encompasses 
 
89 See Jacobson, supra note 84, at 365. 
90 Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1886-88. In that case, after reading a violent statement 
that Justin Carter, a teenage boy in Texas, had posted on his public Facebook page, a Canadian 
woman tracked down Carter’s address in order to report the post to the police in his locality. Id. at 
1886. Carter’s post, which included the phrase “I think I[’m going to] SHOOT UP A 
KINDERGARTEN,” had been directed at a friend and was apparently part of an ongoing “war of 
words” with a friend, who had “‘trashed’ him first.” Id. at 1886-88. The friend to whom the post was 
directed did not contact the police. Id. at 1888. Carter spent four months in jail before being released 
on bail, and the charges stemming from the arrest were pending for five years before being dismissed 
in exchange for a guilty plea. Id. at 1886-87. 
91 Jordan Strauss, Context Is Everything: Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating True Threats 
Under the First Amendment, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 231, 264-65, 267-68 (2003). 
92 Counter to Strauss’s argument, the analysis should not end if the speaker targets a group. In 
such a case, analysis should proceed as to the nature of the group, including whether the group 
targeted is a discrete and identifiable group and whether the group targeted is geographically or 
otherwise accessible to the speaker such that any members hearing the threat might feel targeted. 
In some instances the fact that a speaker stops short of identifying a single, discernible individual 
target might indicate that the speaker lacks a plan for carrying out any purported threat. But in 
other cases, speech targeting a group whose members are relatively small in number, visibly or 
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potentially infinite variations, where under the specific facts at issue the 
method of communication results in a greater or lesser likelihood that the 
speaker intended to put a target in fear of violence. But these factors are 
nonetheless possible to discern in the choices that speakers make in their social 
media use, for which lawyers should account in making the case that a 
communication does or does not show a subjective intent to make a true threat. 
Further evidentiary potential for social media records comes from the fact 
that on most platforms, audience responses are recorded and can become 
interpretive tools for an original utterance. In other words, a speaker’s intent in 
a given social media post can become clear through the responses the 
communication attracts and the way the speaker responds to those responses. 
If a user on Twitter, for example, publishes a tweet, then receives a response 
that appears to misunderstand her intent, she ordinarily has an opportunity to 
clarify the intent of her first tweet in a second one, a reply to the response.93 
How much evidentiary weight should be attached to the lack of such a clarifying 
reply—that is, whether the respondent’s interpretation should be presumed to 
be in line with the original speaker’s intent, absent a statement to the 
contrary—will likely be a case-specific question that accounts for the user’s 
general habits, including how closely monitored the account is, whether the 
user regularly replied to interlocutors on the account, and how visible the 
interpretive response was to the original speaker. But replies to a post are easily 
discoverable and have the potential to explain how a post was understood and 
whether the speaker disagreed with that reception,94 and this evidence should 
therefore be accounted for in threat prosecutions when available. 
C. Accounting for Platform-Based and Technological Constraints 
The structural constraints and default settings that determine the form of 
expression that can take place on a given social media platform may also 
provide evidence of what a user intended her communications on that 
 
otherwise identifiable, and located near the speaker may be sufficiently definite to support a finding 
that the threat was actually intended to put group members in fear. 
93 See, e.g., Shannon Romano, PhD (@sromano23), TWITTER (Nov. 10, 2018, 5:26 AM), 
https://twitter.com/sromano23/status/1061248740596559872 [https://perma.cc/H4B3-QYHY] (“Maybe 
it was poor word choice. Sorry. Didn’t mean to imply your parent didn’t do a wonderful job raising 
you.”); see also T. S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909–1962, at 7 
(1963) (“That is not it at all / That is not what I meant, at all.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
94 See Cinzia Padovani, The Media of the Ultra-Right: Discourse and Audience Activism Online, 15 
J. LANGUAGE & POL. 399, 412 (2016) (using the comments posted under a press release by a far-
right political organization to “decod[e]” the press release by examining, in part, “[w]hat element of 
the original message resonated most among the audience”); see also United States v. Dutcher, 851 
F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2017) (using comments from concerned friends to reach the conclusion that a 
Facebook post including a threat against President Obama had been taken seriously by observers 
who knew the defendant). 
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platform to express. For example, Professors Lidsky and Norbut note that a 
platform like Twitter, with a relatively low character limit for a single message, 
may frustrate a user’s ability to engage in nuanced figurative language like 
“sarcasm, hyperbole, or jests”—making misinterpretation of such utterances 
more likely.95 But in recent years, Twitter has become more advanced in its 
design and allows users to “thread” sequential messages, so that a user who 
sends multiple 280-character tweets in a row can ensure that they will appear 
in the correct order and appear, at least somewhat, like a paragraph instead of 
a series of disjointed thoughts out of context.96 Component tweets of a Twitter 
“thread” may still prove more easily taken out of context than any given 
sentence in a longer Facebook or blog post, though, given that the entire thread 
may not always load all at once.97 Members of the legal community interested 
in assessing the contents of a tweet should be aware that the full context of a 
tweet may not be available at first glance, and that this may have an effect on 
the way a tweet was perceived by relevant parties. 
Another platform-specific feature is the retweet function, also unique to 
Twitter. This function, when employed by user A, posts a message originally 
tweeted by user B on user A’s account—essentially linking to user B’s message 
but in a manner that displays the full content of the link on user A’s page.98 
The link’s continued viability depends on user B’s continued decision not to 
 
95 Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1910. 
96 See Aliza Rosen & Ikuhiro Ihara, Giving You More Characters to Express Yourself, TWITTER: BLOG 
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2017/Giving-you-more-characters-to-
express-yourself.html [https://perma.cc/D3WH-2Z92] (announcing that the maximum length of a Twitter 
post would double, from 140 characters to 280 characters); Help Center: How to Create a Thread on Twitter, 
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/create-a-thread [https://perma.cc/MVC8-BBGD] 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (“Sometimes we need more than one Tweet to express ourselves. A thread on 
Twitter is a series of connected Tweets from one person. With a thread you can provide additional context, 
an update, or an extended point by connecting multiple Tweets together.”); see also Aja Romano, Twitter’s 
New Thread Feature Takes Us One Step Closer to Longform Tweeting, VOX (Dec. 15, 2017, 12:10 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/12/15/16771922/twitter-new-threading-feature [https://perma.cc/RN3L-
GXVD] (“The new display should make it much easier to actually read and write threads.”). Some early 
research suggests that the increased length of Twitter posts changed the content shared on the site, 
improving the “quality of discourse” by allowing room for the development of more nuanced ideas within 
a single tweet. Yphtach Lelkes, Kokil Jaidka & Alvin Zhou, Twitter Got Somewhat More Civil When Tweets 
Doubled in Length. Here’s How We Know., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Sept. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/17/twitter-got-somewhat-more-civil-when-tweets-dou
bled-length-heres-how-we-know [https://perma.cc/MP9J-2ZLX]. 
97 See Romano, supra note 93 (“[W]ith particularly long threads . . . , when you click on the 
first tweet, Twitter will only display the first 200. When you click on the most recent tweet, you can 
only see a few tweets back. Lost in the middle are about 75 tweets that are essentially totally 
inaccessible.” (emphasis omitted)). 
98 See Help Center: Retweet FAQs, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-
twitter/retweet-faqs [https://perma.cc/9MBC-4RKQ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (“Retweets look 
like normal Tweets with the author’s name and username next to it, but are distinguished by the 
Retweet icon . . . and the name of the person who Retweeted the Tweet.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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delete the tweet, though user A may decide to undo the retweet, removing 
the link from user A’s profile.99 As Twitter gained popularity, a dispute arose, 
especially among people employed by traditional media outlets, regarding 
what a retweet “meant.” It is now common to see a phrase along the lines of 
“Retweets do not signal endorsement” on journalists’ profiles, indicating that 
anyone viewing their tweets should not presume that they agree with, 
endorse, or vouch for the truth of any tweets from others to which they have 
linked on their own profiles.100 In at least one legal context, a Twitter user has 
been held personally responsible for the content of another user’s tweet, 
which she retweeted.101 And somewhat surprisingly, a prosecution for a true 
threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) was allowed to proceed on evidence that the 
defendant had retweeted threatening messages.102 While this prosecution was 
arguably influenced by other factors and this conclusion may not be 
generalizable,103 the conclusion reached by the magistrate judge in that case 
should nevertheless give observers pause. The prospect of prosecution for a 
 
99 Id. 
100 See Charlie Warzel, Meet the Man Behind Twitter’s Most Infamous Phrase, BUZZFEED (Apr. 
15, 2014, 2:51 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/meet-the-man-behind-
twitters-most-infamous-phrase [https://perma.cc/2G76-MWDW] (interviewing an early adopter of 
the disclaimer, who explained that he “wanted to be clear that a retweet did not necessarily indicate 
agreement. Nor did it mean [he] was confirming what another news organization was reporting.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
101 Callum Borchers, Retweets ≠ Endorsements? Oh, Yes, They Do, Say the Hatch Act Police, WASH. 
POST: THE FIX (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/04/retweets-
endorsements-hatch-act/?utm_term=.8f6309cb6ffb [https://perma.cc/NZM7-WTA2] (describing the 
decision of the United States Office of Special Counsel to issue a warning to United Nations Ambassador 
Nikki Haley, whose retweet of a tweet supporting a candidate for political office was interpreted as an 
endorsement of the candidate in violation of the Hatch Act). 
102 See United States v. Yassin, No. 16-03024-01, 2017 WL 1324141, at *4-5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017) 
(report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by No. 16-3024-01 (Apr. 6, 2017) (rejecting 
the defendant’s argument that because the retweeted threats did not consist of “her words, . . . as a 
matter of law, it [could not] be alleged that she made threats”). The discussion of subjective intent in 
this opinion was unnecessary, as the Eighth Circuit applies a reasonable-listener test to true threat 
prosecutions, but nonetheless took a strong position that a user who retweets a threatening 
communication “intends to convey the message that she agrees with the ‘tweet.’” Id. at *5 (quoting 
Bethany C. Stein, Comment, A Bland Interpretation: Why a Facebook “Like” Should Be Protected First 
Amendment Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1255, 1277 (2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 See, e.g., Katie Zavadski, The American Anti-Vaccine Mom Turned ISIS Superstar, DAILY BEAST 
(July 12, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-american-anti-vaccine-mom-turned-isis-
superstar [https://perma.cc/4W9G-4CVL] (describing Yassin’s alleged ties to the Islamic State and 
noting that in addition to retweeting other ISIS-affiliated users’ threats, she was alleged to have 
“produce[d] . . . original content” including sharing photos and addresses of U.S. military personnel); 
see also generally U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) 
to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in 
Countering the Threat ¶¶ 4-34, U.N. Doc. S/2016/92 (Jan. 29, 2016) (describing the international 
community’s assessment of the threats posed by the Islamic State in 2016 and highlighting the role of 
online social media in the organization’s efforts to recruit international support). 
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retweet—when it is arguably unsettled what the “meaning” of a retweet is,104 
and thus a defendant could have intended the action of retweeting to mean 
something entirely different than a full-throated endorsement of the original 
tweet’s message—would seem to leave too much discretion in the hands of 
individual members of the judicial branch. Such discretion, exercised without 
more precise guidance from experts and without systemic guidance from the 
Supreme Court, is likely to replicate the systemic biases of other parts of 
society, which can be mediated through and even exacerbated by language 
differences.105 This result would undermine the promise of the First 
Amendment, as well as the Constitution’s equal protection and due process 
guarantees, and should be guarded against in the development of the true 
threat doctrine and its application to speech on the Internet. 
Other relevant features of specific platforms include the disappearing-
photo feature on platforms like Snapchat.106 As Lidsky and Romano note, the 
fact that a photo message is visible for only a limited period of time could make 
any threat sent over Snapchat either “more or less ominous.”107 They also note 
the evidentiary problems inherent in proving a threat sent over Snapchat: 
because the message disappears once viewed, investigators looking into a 
perceived threat have to rely on the memory of the participant, which may be 
unreliable in the immediate aftermath due to the viewer’s emotional response—
perhaps a response that is outsized in comparison to the emotional reaction the 
speaker intended or anticipated producing.108 If a Snapchat message is 
recovered109—a process which takes a considerable amount of time110—the very 
fact that the sender used Snapchat, or a similar time-limited messaging service, 
could support a claim that the sender intended to threaten the recipient. The 
 
104 See John Dickerson, What RTs Mean, JOHN DICKERSON, https://johndickerson.com/blog/what-
rts-mean [https://perma.cc/9Y7W-NFAV] (last visited Jan. 9, 2019) (providing one Twitter user’s 
explanation of several such possible “meanings” he intends to convey by retweeting another user’s tweet). 
105 See, e.g., Brief of Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al., supra note 65, at 19-23 (describing 
social science research demonstrating the effect of an association with rap music on potential jurors’ 
perception of a defendant); John Eligon, Speaking Black Dialect in Courtrooms Can Have Striking 
Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/us/black-dialect-
courtrooms.html [https://perma.cc/6LA4-DE6C] (describing a significantly higher rate of 
transcription errors in courtroom testimony given with African-American English grammar and 
vocabulary compared to testimony given in standard American English). 
106 Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1910. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.; see also supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (explaining the need for a subjective-
intent requirement as a safe harbor for expression that unintentionally crosses a line into threatening). 
109 Although a photo or message sent through Snapchat disappears from the recipient’s inbox 
once it has been viewed, in some cases content is retained on Snapchat’s servers for up to thirty days 
and can be made available to law enforcement agencies. SNAP LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE, supra 
note 59, at 4, 9-10. 
110 Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1911. 
2020] Context, Content, Intent 755 
sender’s choice of medium could be cited to argue that the sender knew that 
the message’s content was illicit or otherwise desired to evade detection. 
More generally, factfinders should take into account the range of options 
available to a speaker on a given platform. On a platform that does not allow 
for traditional forms of textual emphasis like bolding or underlining, a user’s 
choice to use all-capitalized text for emphasis may look less threatening than 
it would in another context.111 Where a Snapchat user had the option to use a 
“neutral yellow” version of the emoji that shows a man running, but instead 
chose a version of the emoji with dark brown skin, it may be reasonable for a 
jury to draw inferences from that choice as to the user’s intent.112 Evaluation 
of these choices requires further research, and may raise even more questions: 
Such choices by users may be weighted differently depending on other 
evidence, such as whether the user was aware of the full complement of 
choices the platform offered.113 Additionally, departure from a default 
formatting choice may be appropriately weighted as more demonstrative of a 
user’s intent than using the default formatting option.114 But where this 
 
111 Compare Paul Lukas, All-Caps Typography Is Doomed, NEW REPUBLIC (June 23, 2013), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/113578/using-all-caps-worst-form-emphasis [https://perma.cc/EQ9J-
B3T3] (“The standard criticism is that using all-caps is akin to shouting.”), with u/Voyager5589, How 
Do We Still Not Have Italics in iMessage?, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/
r/apple/comments/8d71xp/how_do_we_still_not_have_italics_in_imessage [https://perma.cc/HB4A-
4A2V] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019) (lamenting that in the absence of other forms of emphasis, users of 
the iMessage messaging platform are “left with just using all caps”); see also Gretchen McCulloch, The 
Meaning of All Caps—in Texting and in Life, WIRED (July 23, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
story/all-caps-because-internet-gretchen-mcculloch [https://perma.cc/28N3-5ZGB] (“Typewriters 
and early computer terminals . . . wouldn’t let you type italics and underlines or change font sizes (for 
that matter, many social media sites still don’t). This created a vacuum into which the preexisting but 
relatively uncommon shouty caps expanded.”). 
112 Geneus, supra note 7, at 451. 
113 It is not implausible that a software update could add new default settings to a 
communication platform without making users aware. See, e.g., John Patrick Pullen, The Ultimate 
Guide to Apple’s New Messages App, TIME (Oct. 18, 2016), http://time.com/4534887/apple-messages-
imessage-tips-tricks/ [https://perma.cc/9RVL-748T] (noting that iPhone users might have noticed 
“a surprise or two” in the text messages they sent after updating to a new version of the iPhone 
operating system, including messages automatically accompanied by “a burst of confetti,” and 
explaining this and other new features to users who were not otherwise made aware of them). In 
fact, in researching this topic in the spring of 2019, this author learned for the first time of several 
extratextual features her iPhone has been capable of executing since 2016. 
114 Take the example of using an emoji of a running human, and the choice to use a version of 
that emoji with dark brown skin rather than either the “neutral yellow” emoji or any other of “various 
shades of white and brown.” See Geneus, supra note 7, at 431-32, 451 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Choosing an emoji with any of the more realistic skin tones requires an additional step in 
the typing process, where the cartoonish yellow emojis are made the default choice. Matt Klein, How 
to Change Emoji Skin Tones on iPhone and OS X, HOW-TO GEEK (June 30, 2016, 12:34 PM), 
https://www.howtogeek.com/260800/how-to-change-emoji-skin-tones-on-iphone-and-os-x [https://
perma.cc/JE9D-4LKA]; see also Zara Rahman, The Problem with Emoji Skin Tones That No One Talks 
About, DAILY DOT (Dec. 18, 2018, 5:50 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/irl/skin-tone-emoji 
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information may add further context and further elucidate the reasons behind 
a user’s expressive social media content, it should also be considered as 
relevant to determining her subjective intent in disseminating that content. 
IV. THE NEED FOR SPECIFICITY IN PROSECUTING TRUE THREATS 
Lower courts’ attempts to apply subjective-intent requirements to 
Internet statements, whether related to charges brought under § 875(c) after 
Elonis or under other statutes, so far reveal a lack of preparation for the charge 
of fully weighing evidence about a defendant’s subjective intent. 
A. Elonis on Remand 
On remand from the Supreme Court, following the Court’s 
announcement that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) encompassed a subjective-intent 
requirement, the Third Circuit in United States v. Elonis reviewed the record 
again to consider whether its prior application of the statute was nevertheless 
harmless.115 The court assessed the evidence adduced at Elonis’s trial, in light 
of the jury instruction prescribed by the Supreme Court: that the jury could 
convict if it found that Elonis “transmit[ted] a communication for the 
purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication 
w[ould] be viewed as a threat.”116 Any error would be harmless if a jury 
properly instructed under the new standard could nevertheless have found 
Elonis guilty, because the facts shown at trial established Elonis’s subjective 
intent such that no rational jury could find that Elonis had committed the 
relevant acts without also finding the required mens rea.117 
The Third Circuit decided that under either a knowledge or recklessness 
standard, a jury faced with the evidence presented at Elonis’s trial would have 
convicted him on each of four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).118 The first 
of these counts was based on threatening statements directed at Elonis’s ex-
wife, which he made on Facebook over the course of slightly more than a 
month.119 In concluding that no rational juror would have believed Elonis had 
he testified to a lack of knowledge or intent that his posts would make his ex-
wife feel threatened, the court relied on the “graphic nature” of the messages, 
 
[https://perma.cc/62ZT-2LS4] (discussing some of the reasons a user might choose an emoji of a 
particular skin color and how such choices can affect the message received by the sender’s audience). 
115 841 F.3d 589, 597-601 (3d. Cir. 2016). 
116 Id. at 596 (quoting United States v. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015)). 
117 Id. at 598. The Third Circuit cited Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Elonis as the impetus 
for its consideration of harmless error on remand. Id. at 596 (citing Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Alito, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
118 Id. at 598. 
119 Id. 
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reproducing the text of the posts in full.120 But the court also referred to 
developments in the real world between the two posts, specifically that Elonis’s 
ex-wife sought a restraining order after his first allegedly threatening approach, 
and that he continued to post similar messages after a restraining order was 
issued against him—including one referencing the restraining order.121 The 
court found that Elonis’s decision to continue with similar posts following the 
restraining order made it “less credible still” that he had disseminated the post 
without either the purpose or knowledge that his ex-wife would interpret the 
posts as threats—and that “[n]o rational juror could conclude otherwise.”122 
Similarly, in affirming Elonis’s conviction on another count, for 
threatening to injure employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and a county 
sheriff ’s department, the court quoted language from Elonis’s posts that gave 
rise to the indictment.123 It held that Elonis’s experience with the threats he 
had made about his ex-wife—and other, previous threats made on Facebook 
toward former co-workers that had resulted in his termination—made it more 
likely that a jury would find that Elonis knew that a reasonable person could 
interpret these posts, too, as threats.124 In so concluding, the court rejected 
Elonis’s arguments that the form of his posts—rap lyrics—and the forum 
through which he posted them—Facebook, which he argued was “a medium 
that magnifies the potential for disconnect between the speaker’s intent and 
the audience’s understanding”—would have allowed a jury to find that Elonis 
did not know that his posts would be taken as threats.125 Because Elonis had 
already seen the effect that earlier lyrical Facebook posts had on his ex-wife, 
and had witnessed the consequences of those posts in the form of a restraining 
order issued against him, the court concluded that Elonis was “clearly aware” 
of how his audience would interpret this subsequent post.126 
 
120 Id. at 593-94, 599. 
121 Id. at 598. 
122 Id. at 599. 
123 Id. at 599-600. 
124 Id. at 600. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. The court also found that the language Elonis used in this later threat against law 
enforcement officials was “[i]f anything, . . . more explicit” than those that had resulted in his 
termination and the restraining order. Id. at 599. The court did not explain this conclusion in further 
detail, but it would seem to contradict the paradigmatic reasoning in Watts that a conditional 
statement is less objectively threatening than a statement not couched in conditional terms. See id. 
(“Despite that, he posted yet another violent message stating his intention to detonate explosives 
near State Police officers and the Sheriff ’s Department if ‘worse comes to worse.’”); cf. Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (“We agree with petitioner that his only offense here was ‘a 
kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.’ Taken in 
context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the 
listeners, we do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.”). 
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As to the third count of violating § 875(c), which charged Elonis with 
communicating a threat to injure a kindergarten class of elementary school 
children, the court relied solely on the language Elonis used and the context 
of the statement.127 The court found Elonis’s language “graphic and specific” 
and “narrow[ed] . . . to kindergarten classes”; in particular, the court was 
troubled by the post’s conclusion, a “haunting question that suggests he will 
carry out his threat imminently.”128 The court then assessed that post in the 
context of “the understandable sensitivity regarding school shootings in this 
country,” of which it assumed without evidence Elonis had some awareness.129 
On the fourth count of violating § 875(c), the court returned to relying on 
Elonis’s prior experiences with his Facebook posts as “overwhelming[]” 
evidence that Elonis knew how his post that purportedly threatened an FBI 
agent would be interpreted.130 
The Elonis remand decision, therefore, shows a court that engages 
inconsistently with the types of social media evidence outlined in Part III. 
On the majority of the counts it reviewed, the court looked to the real-world 
responses to Elonis’s posts, ranging from the grant of a protective order 
against him to a visit from FBI agents, to demonstrate that it would have 
been impossible for Elonis not to know that his similar, subsequent Facebook 
posts could be viewed as threats.131 This conclusion relies on similar reasoning 
to my suggestion that subsequent comments provide an interpretive frame 
for a post.132 It arguably makes an even stronger showing to the same end. 
Where a person making a Facebook post might not see subsequent comments 
on that post,133 Elonis was visited by officers in person and therefore could 
not claim that he was not on notice of the reactions to his lyrical threats.134 
This overwhelming evidence based on real-world interactions outweighed the 
persuasive weight of Elonis’s platform-based argument about the uncertain 
nature of Facebook posts and his context-based argument about the uncertain 
status of threatening statements made in rap music.135 Because he had 
previously made similar statements on the same platform using a similar 
 
127 Elonis, 841 F.3d at 600. 
128 Id. The court reproduced the post at issue in its entirety before this analysis, and it follows here: 
“That’s it, I’ve had about enough / I’m checking out and making a name for myself / Enough elementary 
schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined / And hell hath 
no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class / The only question is . . . which one?” Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 600-01. Though the court again reproduced the relevant text in full, its analysis did 
not elaborate at all on the import of the language or format of the post. 
131 See supra notes 119–126 and accompanying text (outlining the court’s findings on these grounds). 
132 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (discussing the way responses clarify the 
meaning of an original post). 
133 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94. 
134 Elonis, 841 F.3d at 600. 
135 Id. 
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lyrical form, and had received feedback that members of his social circle found 
posts phrased in that manner threatening, a reasonable jury could have found 
that he acted with knowledge that similar reactions would result from his 
similar, subsequent statements. 
The decision on remand falls short of persuasive, however, in its 
reexamination of the count charging Elonis with threatening to injure a class 
of kindergartners. The decision mentions the “graphic nature” of Elonis’s 
language and the “haunting question” with which the post ends, but goes no 
further in articulating what evidentiary value this language could have to a 
jury determining whether Elonis knew or intended the post to be a threat.136 
It is not enough under a subjective standard to simply identify the nature of 
the language in a social media threat. At most, a judge’s pronouncement that 
a post contains “graphic” language speaks to the perception of a reasonable 
observer—effectively duplicating the objective-intent standard, reading the 
specific, necessary protections of a subjective-intent requirement out of the 
true-threat analysis.137 As mentioned above, there is no evidence that 
definitively links any specific word or phrasing choice to a specific mental 
state; however, courts should require some reasoning in accepting a 
prosecutor’s contention that a defendant’s use of a word or phrase is probative 
as to that individual defendant’s state of mind. 
B. Other Courts’ Application of Subjective-Intent Standards 
In the limited number of other cases where courts have considered alleged 
threats made via social media under a subjective-intent standard, they have 
approached social media evidence much like the Third Circuit in its decision 
in Elonis on remand. Courts familiar with principles of notice and fair 
warning are almost universally comfortable with assessing when a defendant’s 
prior conduct, particularly his prior online speech and the reactions of others 
to that speech, should have warned him that similar speech acts would be 
received by audiences as threatening. In United States v. Dutcher, a defendant 
who announced on his Facebook page his intent to travel to a nearby town 
where the President was scheduled to speak and assassinate the President was 
convicted under a subjective-intent standard.138 His conviction was upheld in 
part because, rather than recanting the threatening statement when Facebook 
friends commented, expressing worry and urging him to “[s]tay calm,” the 
defendant continued to post Facebook updates in a similar vein.139 Although 
 
136 Supra text accompanying notes 128–130. 
137 See supra notes 81–88, 93–94 & 105 (describing how different social groups use language 
differently, including using the same phrase or action to mean different things). 
138 851 F.3d 757, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2017). 
139 Id. at 762. 
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the commenters’ expressions of alarm in Dutcher were not so severe a reaction 
as the law-enforcement responses in Elonis, where the FBI monitored the 
Elonis’s Facebook account and visited him at his house,140 the comments on 
the defendant’s posts in Dutcher were nevertheless sufficiently clear in 
demonstrating alarm that the defendant’s subsequent posts could be 
considered knowing.141 
Even in conducting this relatively familiar analysis, though, some courts 
are unclear as to the function of evidence of an audience’s reaction,142 which 
can be admitted in different contexts to demonstrate both objective and 
subjective components of a true threat.143 In integrating the more novel 
 
140 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2006 (2015). 
141 Dutcher, 851 F.3d at 762; see also State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1, 25 (Conn. 2018) (“[I]f the 
defendant had been unaware when he sent the first e-mail that it would be interpreted as a serious 
threat, he would have reacted quite differently to [his acquaintance’s] characterization of the e-mail 
as ‘disturbing’ and his admonition to the defendant to refrain from making such statements.”). But see 
People v. Khan, 127 N.E.3d 592 (Ill. Ct. App. 2018). In the Khan case, the prosecution relied on the 
fact that the defendant, like Elonis, had previously been visited by police investigating threatening 
statements he had made online. Id. at 595. Both posts reported as threatening were made on Facebook, 
and the fact that police had interviewed the defendant after a 2010 post could reasonably have called 
into question the defendant’s credibility in insisting, in 2013, that “[e]veryone knows if you post 
something on Facebook it’s a joke.” Id. at 595-96. But in upholding the conviction, the Illinois 
Appellate Court did not refer to this evidence of past conduct in its analysis. See id. at 603. Instead it 
relied on the content of the defendant’s message, “which told people that he came to school every day 
with a gun and was going to use it on somebody,” the fact that fear was a foreseeable consequence of 
posting such a message from an anonymous Facebook account, and holding that juries were entitled 
to infer that the defendant “intended the natural and probable consequences of his act.” Id. 
142 Compare Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1159-60 (Pa. 2018) (relying heavily on the 
reactions of the police officers named in an allegedly threatening rap song once they had discovered 
the song), with United States v. LaFontaine, No. 15-77, 2015 WL 5999834, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 14, 
2015) (excluding on relevancy grounds evidence showing how recipients had responded to the 
defendant’s phone calls, on the basis that “[a] recipient’s reaction to an alleged threat is not relevant 
to the charge of communicating threats” after Elonis). 
143 As Elonis and Dutcher demonstrate, evidence of an audience’s reaction to prior purported 
threats can be highly relevant as to a defendant’s subjective intent in making subsequent statements 
understood as threats. See supra notes 121–126, 131–135, 138–141, and accompanying text. But an 
audience reaction that follows a threat can only be relevant to whether a reasonable observer would 
find the defendant’s statement threatening, as persuasive evidence that at least some people did (or 
did not) find the statement to articulate a threat. To find the latter type of reaction evidence relevant 
to a defendant’s subjective intent would assume that a defendant can anticipate with a high degree 
of accuracy her audience’s eventual responses. But to exclude the former type of reaction evidence 
(or its absence, as the case may be) could prevent a defendant from demonstrating that similar past 
statements had given her no reason to know that certain language or expressions could be interpreted 
as threatening. Cf. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Nobody who 
read the message board postings, however, knew that he had a .50 caliber gun or that he would send 
the later emails. Neither of these facts could therefore, under an objective test, ‘have a bearing on 
whether [Bagdasarian’s] statements might reasonably be interpreted as a threat’ by a reasonable 
person in the position of those who saw his postings . . . .” (quoting United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 
491, 502 (7th Cir. 2008))). The lack of clarity in the standard regarding audience reaction evidence 
can inhibit defendants from making their strongest cases, either way. 
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features of Internet communication in their analysis of subjective intent, 
courts are even more inconsistent. The fact that a speaker may know 
concretely which individuals make up his online audience, based on the 
privacy settings applied to his social media accounts, can be a potent tool for 
discovering whether a defendant intended his online message to reach an 
individual named in the message—or indeed, whether he intended his 
message to reach anyone at all.144 In United States v. Wheeler, the Tenth Circuit 
overturned a conviction because the defendant had testified credibly that he 
thought he had removed all of his Facebook “friends,” rendering his profile 
completely private, before posting messages “urging his ‘religious followers’ 
to ‘kill cops.’”145 Wheeler, then, stands clearly for the proposition that under a 
subjective standard, a threat made by a defendant who believes he has no 
audience at all cannot be a punishable true threat. 
But where a defendant has posted a message in a forum where she knows 
that someone might see it, courts’ approaches vary widely. In United States v. 
Stock, the Third Circuit assumed without explanation that an anonymous 
message posted on the website “Craig’s List,” identifying a target by only his 
initials and his profession, could constitute a true threat.146 This is not a self-
evident conclusion: “Craig’s List” (or “Craigslist”) is not a social media 
platform like Facebook or Twitter, in which users create stable profiles and 
receive notifications when other users interact with those profiles or 
associated content.147 Instead, Craigslist functions more like an online 
classified ads section, where users post standalone advertisements seeking or 
offering furniture, housing, or companionship,148 or simply expressing 
themselves;149 any communication takes place off the site through users’ 
existing communication channels.150 Additionally, “[p]eople usually only go 
to Craigslist when they want something specific,”151 as opposed to a social 
networking site which a user might check daily. The court in Stock considered 
none of these distinctions, apparently finding irrelevant to the intent element 
 
144 See supra text accompanying notes 89–90 (highlighting the potential for misunderstanding 
when unintended audiences see a post without understanding its conversational context). 
145 776 F.3d 736, 738-39, 741 (10th Cir. 2015). 
146 728 F.3d 287, 299 (3d Cir. 2013). 
147 See Josh Constine, Facebook Launches Marketplace, a Friendlier Craigslist, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 3, 
2016, 8:01 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/03/facebook-marketplace-2 [https://perma.cc/2HYX-
WVHS] (contrasting the then-new Facebook Marketplace, an online buy-sell forum associated with 
users’ Facebook accounts, with the anonymous, “dead-simple” Craigslist platform). 
148 See generally Philadelphia, CRAIGSLIST, https://philadelphia.craigslist.org [https://perma.cc/PN44-
24H6] (last visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
149 See, e.g., Rants and Raves, CRAIGSLIST, https://philadelphia.craigslist.org/d/rants-raves/search/rnr 
[https://perma.cc/6NKT-HDXG] (last visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
150 How to Reply to Craigslist Postings, CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/help/ 
replying_to_posts [https://perma.cc/GL4F-SCN2] (last visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
151 Constine, supra note 147. 
762 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 733 
whether the defendant anticipated that his target would ever visit Craigslist 
and discover the message.152 Taking the opposite approach, the Sixth Circuit 
in United States v. Jeffries looked to the defendant’s distribution of his music 
video with messages like “[g]ive this to the judge for court,” taking this 
statement of intent that the video reach the judge as part of a “single 
communication” with the video itself.153 
In drawing conclusions from the specific language a defendant used, 
several courts take the approach taken by the Third Circuit in the remanded 
Elonis decision in concluding, essentially, that the language was received as 
threatening and it was therefore intended as a threat.154 In Knox, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court drew a comparison to Watts in noting that the 
language of the statements at issue was “mostly unconditional,” but did not 
go further to explain how the nonconditional statements actually 
demonstrated an intent that they be interpreted as threats.155 In D.C. v. R.R., 
a civil suit involving high school students, a California court directly quoted 
the language of the posts at issue and concluded that the “message [was] 
unequivocal” in its “serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm,” 
“conveyed no less than three times by the phrases ‘rip out your fucking heart,’ 
‘want[] to kill you,’ and ‘pound your head in with an ice pick.’”156 Over the 
defendant’s contention that he had been “in a playful mood” when he posted 
the messages and intended them as a joke, the court concluded that on the 
face of the posts there was no “jocular intent”; instead, “[a]n intent to harm 
[was] evident.”157 This tautological approach to the subjective-intent standard 
 
152 See generally United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2013). 
153 692 F.3d 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1160 (Pa. 
2018) (concluding that although the defendant had not sent the allegedly threatening song directly to 
the police officers named in it, this did not preclude the defendant from having intended the officers 
to hear it); cf. United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 1970) (requiring a heightened 
showing of imminent harm where a threat to the President is “uttered without communication to the 
President intended,” because the rationale behind punishing such threats is not implicated when the 
President neither learns of the threat nor is put in imminent danger because of it). 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 138–139. 
155 Knox, 190 A.3d at 1159-60. 
156 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190, 1219 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
157 Id. at 1206, 1220-21. The opinion in D.C. v. R.R. also assumed without any apposite 
supporting facts that the defendant had “composed” the statements at issue “over a period of at least 
several minutes,” concluding on this basis that “the content of the message and its transmission 
show[ed] deliberation on the part of the author.” Id. at 1219. When the Ninth Circuit came to a 
similar conclusion regarding the weight of the speech in Bagdasarian, it did so on the basis of specific 
findings that demonstrated that the defendant had continued to monitor reactions to his speech—
and that he subsequently took up the same conversation weeks later. United States v. Bagdasarian, 
652 F.3d 1113, 1130 (9th Cir. 2011). Without such specific findings, the court in D.C. relied only on 
its own assumptions about Internet use, without evidence and contrary to the views of other courts 
in similar contexts, which come to the conclusion that the process behind posting online speech is 
less deliberative and more casual than speech in other mediums. D.C., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1219. But 
see, e.g., SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, No. 07-6311, 2008 WL 11348459, at *5 (D. Idaho Dec. 
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is not universal: other courts conduct more thorough analyses of defendants’ 
specific uses of language in context, providing reasoning for the conclusions 
about subjective intent they then draw.158 But the fact that this intensive 
context-based intent analysis is applied selectively—or at the very least, 
inconsistently—poses a problem for the vindication of First Amendment 
rights of defendants whose speech may be afforded greater First Amendment 
protection based on either their own identities or the identities of the judges 
who hear their cases. 
V.  ADMITTING MORE CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE TO FACILITATE 
MORE ACCURATE DETERMINATIONS OF INTENT 
In order to improve their analyses of defendants’ subjective intents, courts 
should be encouraged to interpret relevance rules liberally and admit more 
social media evidence. In the examples of reasoning from evidence discussed 
above, the social media evidence courts failed to consider was generally of the 
sort that, if admitted, would have been helpful to the defendant in providing 
more context. Especially in the early days of prosecutions under subjective-
intent standards, and in light of the evidence in this Comment that courts 
have not yet fully appreciated the probative effects of contextual evidence, 
courts should err on the side of speech protection in admitting contextual 
evidence. The associated risks of confusion and delay are not insubstantial, 
but even a temporary period of over-admitting contextual evidence would 
provide appellate courts with the opportunity to observe outcomes and 
provide guidance for lower courts applying the new standard. 
The argument for adopting a liberal posture toward the admission of 
contextual evidence is further supported by the principle that intent is a 
question of fact, best resolved by juries.159 Even where judges are the primary 
 
23, 2008) (“Internet blogs, message boards, and chat rooms are, by their nature, typically casual 
expressions of opinion.”). 
158 See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 196 A.3d 106, 121 (N.J. Super. 2018) (concluding in the absence of 
any specific threatening language that the defendant had merely “expressed disdain” for the party 
named in her posts and instructing the prosecution that a conviction would require showing that 
specific “cohorts or allies of [the] defendant would understand her expression of hope [that someone 
“‘blow’ the[] glasses . . . off his face”] as a request or command and would act on it; and that [the] 
defendant intended that reaction”); see also Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1121 (concluding that the context 
of the defendant’s statements about the President, on a financial news message board, “blunt[ed] 
any perception that statements made there were serious expressions of intended violence”). 
159 See United States v. Yassin, No. 16-03024-01, 2017 WL 1324141, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 
2017) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by No. 16-3024-01 (Apr. 6, 2017) 
(“[T]he question of whether the allegations . . . constitute a true threat is a question reserved for 
the jury and thus would seem premature at [the motion to dismiss] stage . . . .”); accord Universal 
Calvary Church v. City of New York, No. 96-4606-99, 2000 WL 1538019, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 
2000) (“The question of intent is a question of fact for the jury.” (citing Casimir v. Hoffman, 213 
N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961))). 
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arbiters on the question of intent, more evidence can only contribute to 
better-informed decisions. Whether a judge or jury will make the ultimate 
findings of fact, though, judges must also be careful to emphasize the 
analytical distinction between the evidence that supports the subjective-
intent finding and evidence that demonstrates how an observer would have 
reacted.160 A clear delineation between these separate findings is necessary: 
if factfinders are not clearly instructed on these standards, the reasonable-
observer evidence may elide into evidence of what the individual speaker 
actually intended, reinstating the underprotective, tautological reasoning 
identified as problematic in Part IV.161 
As an alternative, Professors Lidsky and Norbut have proposed the 
creation of an affirmative defense for context, which in their explanation 
would allow defendants, who are in the best position to know what context 
will be helpful in persuading juries that they lacked intent, to best rebut a 
prosecution’s showing of intent to threaten.162 Along with this defense, they 
would add a preliminary hearing before the trial judge where a defendant 
could present his contextual evidence and might get an indictment dismissed 
quickly if the context reveals that he did not intend to make a threat.163 But 
together, these proposals eliminate the protective elements of criminal 
procedure without offering defendants much in return. First, intent is an 
element of any statute criminalizing threats, so while defendants may be in 
the best position to produce this evidence, the burden to persuade on the issue 
of intent properly belongs with the prosecution. And second, there is no 
reason to expect that a pretrial hearing on subjective intent will be resolved 
in the defendant’s favor any more often than the post-trial and remanded 
decisions evaluated in Part IV. Instead of providing defendants with an early 
opportunity to vindicate their rights, then, this procedure could become just 
one more procedural hurdle to clear before a defendant can make her case to 
a jury, the members of which are somewhat more likely to be of her peer 
group than the average judge.164 Instead, making clear that contextual 
 
160 See, e.g., supra note 143 (explaining that evidence of audience reaction can be relevant to 
both standards, depending on the sequence of events at issue). 
161 Recent Case, First Amendment—True Threat Doctrine—Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds Rap 
Song a True Threat—Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 1558, 1564 
(2019) (“In using the listeners’ reactions to Knox’s speech to discern Knox’s subjective intent, the court 
rendered its insistence on finding specific [i.e., subjective] intent meaningless. . . . The emphasis in 
Knox on the listeners’ fearful reactions . . . vitiated the subjective prong of the inquiry.” (internal 
footnote omitted)). But see supra note 143 and accompanying text (positing that a properly framed 
investigation of listener reactions can serve as evidence of a speaker’s intent in subsequent statements). 
162 Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1925-26. 
163 Id. 
164 Compare Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Social Media Update 
2016, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-
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evidence is relevant to the issue of intent, but leaving the burden of proving 
intent with the prosecution and the ultimate decision to a jury whenever 
practicable, will provide more consistent and more conceptually coherent 
protection for defendants who made threatening statements without the 
requisite intent under a properly recalibrated true threats doctrine. 
Neither the minimal adjustments proposed here nor the more significant 
shift outlined above, to a recognition that the First Amendment requires 
subjective intent to be a necessary element of a threat conviction, is likely to 
be outcome-determinative in a significant number of cases. In Elonis, for 
example, even under the stringent examination of contextual evidence and 
evaluation of subjective intent I propose, there appears to be sufficient 
evidence to convict the defendant of at least two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 875(c). But the best argument for announcing a clear, uniform standard in 
this context is not that it offers any individual defendant a greater chance of 
acquittal. Instead, there is additional systemic value in requiring prosecutors, 
juries, and judges to rely on evidentiarily based, logically relevant evidence, 
and to give accurate, non-pretextual reasons, when they argue for and impose 
punishments for speech. Instead of appealing to jurors’ own biases as to 
which, if any, words are beyond the pale in polite society, prosecutors and 
defenders should be given incentives to draw on social media archives, where 
available, and craft arguments about subjective intent that rely on how a 
defendant has spoken in the past, how his interlocutors have responded, and 
what kinds of communicative media have been accessible to him—in order to 
show what he actually knew and meant to say. Requiring such analytical 
clarity in prosecutions for speech would be a step in the direction of ensuring 
that speech is not punished for its bad effects or based on potentially biased 
conjecture about a speaker’s mental state, but only where a speaker 
demonstrably intended to cause harm and actually did so. 
  
 
media-update-2016/ [https://perma.cc/Q6K5-CNNC], with Age and Experience of Judges, FED. 
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experience-judges 
[https://perma.cc/8KLK-WBHX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019). Of course, age is not the only 
factor that determines a person’s knowledge and patterns of usage of the Internet and social 
media. See, e.g., Nicole Zillien & Eszter Hargittai, Digital Distinction: Status-Specific Types of 
Internet Usage, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 274, 287 (2009) (finding that “social status is significantly related 
to various types of capital-enhancing uses of the Internet, suggesting that those already in more 
privileged positions are reaping the benefits of their time spent online more than users from 
lower socioeconomic backgrounds”). But on most relevant axes, a multi-member jury will be more 
representative of the general population than an individual judge. 
766 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 733 
CONCLUSION 
The true threat doctrine has developed for over a decade without an adequate 
review of its operation within the context of the First Amendment. In that time, 
states and federal jurisdictions have adopted a variety of approaches to filling in 
the gap left by the Supreme Court’s decisions as to what intent the Constitution 
requires. Judges at all levels have also been left without authoritative guidance as 
to the added complications of applying the less-than-clear old decisions to the new 
contexts of social media. The result, as outlined above, is a system of overlapping, 
inconsistent rules, under which one individual may be liable for an act that she 
may not have considered to have any expressive value at all, while another 
individual who expressed a similar sentiment might be found innocent—based on 
geographic location, the prosecuting authority, and even more specific factors like 
an individual judge’s attitude toward and experience with social media. 
To begin to untangle the complicated patchwork of true threat standards, the 
Supreme Court should act, at the next opportunity, to reestablish some uniformity 
in the true threat doctrine by announcing that the true threat standard requires 
measured, informed consideration of the context in which a speech act occurs, to 
assess whether a speaker actually intended to threaten harm. In the meantime, 
though, judges and juries who are already required to evaluate threatening 
statements under a subjective-intent standard may take it upon themselves to use 
insights from social science and media research to more accurately assess intent. 
In requiring that factfinders rely on sufficient, logically relevant evidence when 
they determine that a defendant subjectively intended to make a threat, this 
limitation on the true threat exception increases protections against arbitrary or 
unjustified punishment for speech, increasing the likelihood that criminal 
consequences for speech are imposed only where some actually culpable conduct 
has been shown. 
